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Abstract
This paper considers whether, and how, the mind can be incorporated
into structural realism. Section 1 begins with some definitions, and briefly
reviews the main problems which beset structural realism. The existence
of the mind is proffered as an additional problem, to which the rest of the
paper is devoted. Three different philosophies of the mind are analysed,
beginning with eliminative materialism, which is briefly reviewed in Sec-
tion 2. The identity theory of the mind-brain relationship is critically
analysed in Section 3, and the notions of supervenience and emergentism
are defined. In Section 4, the functionalist approach to the mind-brain
relationship is introduced, and two specific functionalist approaches—the
representational theory of the mind, and connectionism—are defined and
appraised. It is argued that these approaches enable structural realism to
be extended to include the mind. It is also argued that structural real-
ism can be applied to the unconscious mind, and the paper concludes with
the proposal that the distinction between epistemic structural realism and
ontic structural realism is also valid in the case of the mind.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether the existence of the mind can
be incorporated into structural realism, and if so, how.
Let us begin, then, by reviewing some relevant definitions. A mathematical
structure consists of a set, or a collection of sets, (a ‘base’ set or sets), equipped
with properties, relationships, operations and distinguished elements. These
entities are collectively required to satisfy a set of conditions, called the axioms
of the structure. A base set equipped with such a structure is said to be a
structured set. Whilst structural empiricism accepts that mathematical struc-
tures are used in physics to organize, explain and predict empirical phenomena,
it holds that those structures do not characterize anything beyond the empir-
ical phenomena. In contrast, structural realism asserts that, in mathematical
physics at least, the domain of a true theory is an instance of a mathematical
structure which lies beyond the empirical phenomena. It follows that if the do-
main of a true theory extends to the entire universe, then the entire universe is
an instance of a mathematical structure. Equivalently, it can be asserted that
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the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure (Tegmark 1998). One
can refer to this proposal as ‘universal structural realism’.1
Many authors take structural realism to assert that the physical world pos-
sesses a second-order structure, without specifying the physical sets and physical
first-order properties and relationships which possess this structure (see Votsis
2003). This view is inspired by Bertrand Russell, who argued in The Analy-
sis of Matter in 1927 that, at most, what we can know is the second-order
structure of the world which lies beyond empirical phenomena, not the first-
order physical properties and relationships which possess that structure. This
position was dubbed Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR) by Ladyman (1998),
and distinguished from Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), the assertion that the
second-order structure of the physical world is all that exists.
There is, however, no need to accept this second-order approach to struc-
tural realism. Instead, one can assert that the physical world is a specific set,
whose elements are equipped with specific, knowable first-order physical prop-
erties and relationships, which exist beyond the empirical first-order properties
and relationships, and which satisfy the conditions of a certain second-order
structure. Structural realism can be taken to assert that the physical world is
a specific structured set, not merely a second-order structure.
Nevertheless, structural realism faces probably three main problems. Firstly,
there is the so-called Newman problem. As Pooley puts it, “it is a theorem of
set theory and second-order logic that any consistent proposition to the effect
that a certain set of properties and relations exist, no matter what structural
constraints are placed upon this set, will be true of any domain, provided that
the domain has the right cardinality,” (Pooley 2005). This suggests, then, that
structural realism is trivial as an account of the reality beyond the phenomena;
if a physical domain is a set of a specific cardinality, then what lies beyond the
observable properties and relations of that domain will possess any structure of
that cardinality. The empirical properties and relationships, and the structural
conditions they satisfy, might indeed pick out a specific structure, but this is
merely the structure of the empirical phenomena. Structural realism, then,
faces the danger of either being trivial, or collapsing into structural empiricism.
For structural realism to work, it must be possible to infer and define physical
properties and relationships beyond the empirical properties and relationships,
and for the conditions which these properties and relationships satisfy to pick
out a specific structure.
Secondly, a theory with a fixed structure can possess more than one realist
interpretation. For example, consider the many-worlds interpretation (MWI)
and the Bohm-deBroglie interpretation of quantum mechanics. If there is more
than one realist interpretation for a fixed theoretical structure, it arguably indi-
cates that more than structure alone exists beyond the empirical data. This, of
1Whilst the definition of structural realism is most frequently expressed in terms of the
set-theoretical, Bourbaki notion of a species of mathematical structure, one can reformulate
the definition in terms of other approaches to the foundations of mathematics, such as math-
ematical category theory. In the latter case, one would assert that our physical universe is an
object in a mathematical category.
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course, is precisely the thesis of ESR, and Ladyman proposes OSR as a means
of abstaining from further interpretation of a fixed structure. Personally, how-
ever, I would argue that whenever different realist interpretations of a physical
theory exist, they each tacitly require either a modification or an addition to
the existing structure of the theory. For example, DeWitt’s version of the MWI
tacitly invokes the notion of branching space-time, and this corresponds to a dif-
ferent mathematical structure for space-time than that assumed in conventional
quantum mechanics.
Thirdly, there is the problem of so-called ‘Jones under-determination’. This
occurs when a theory has more than one formulation, each of which is empirically
equivalent. (This should not to be confused with the ‘under-determination of
theory by data’, which occurs when there are distinct theories, each of which
is empirically equivalent). The problem for structural realism occurs when the
different formulations of a theory involve different mathematical structures. For
example, in the traditional formulation of canonical classical general relativity,
the configuration space is the set of Rimennian metric tensor fields on a 3-
manifold Σ, but in Ashtekar’s ‘new variables’ formulation, the configuration
space is the space of connections upon an SU(2)-principal fibre bundle over
Σ. These are non-isomorphic structures. Whilst Schrodinger’s wave mechanics
formulation of quantum mechanics did, indeed, transpire to be isomorphic to
Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics formulation, such an outcome is highly untypical.
Clearly, if there are non-isomorphic formulations of a theory, then a structural
realist cannot say which of these structures the theory is committed to the
instantiation of. It is true that the different formulations of a theory must share
some common structure in order to be empirically equivalent, but the structure
they share in order to achieve this, is the structure of the empirical phenomena,
hence, once again, structural realism runs the risk of collapsing into structural
empiricism.
These are serious, but well-known problems for structural realism. In this
paper I wish to draw attention to an additional problem which, to the best of
my knowledge, has gone previously unacknowledged. Given that structural em-
piricism does not purport to extend beyond the realm of empirical phenomena,
it is not under any obligation to include the mental within its remit. In contrast,
universal structural realism purports to have an unrestricted range of validity.
Because universal structural realism claims that the universe is an instance of a
mathematical structure, it is necessary to consider whether, and how, the mind
can be incorporated within it.
There are three distinct positions in the philosophy of the mind which I wish
to consider. Broadly, they can be defined as follows:
• Eliminative materialism: The brain exists, but the mind does not.
• Identity theory: The mind and the brain both exist, but the mind can be
reduced to the brain in the specific sense that the mind can be identified
with the brain.
3
• Functionalism: The mind and the brain both exist, and the mind super-
venes on the brain, but the mind cannot be identified with the brain.
Whilst eliminative materialism and the identity theory of the mind-brain
relationship provide no reason to modify or extend structural realism, I will
argue that functionalism opens up some interesting new possibilities. Before
we proceed, however, it should be emphasized that the primary purpose of this
paper is to illustrate the possibilities for extending structural realism, and, as
such, the approach adopted to the philosophy of the mind is highly selective
and non-systematic.
2 Eliminative materialism
Eliminative materialism (EM) accepts that the mind cannot be reduced to the
brain, but claims that the psychological terms used to describe the mind are
terms which have no referents. Unlike the identity theory discussed below, EM
does not claim that psychology and neurophysiology provide two different lev-
els of description of the same system; rather, EM claims that the language of
psychology does not provide a description of anything at all. Eliminative mate-
rialism obviously poses no problems for universal structural realism: if the mind
doesn’t exist, then structural realism merely has to incorporate the structure
of the brain into its ontology. The universe is an instance of a mathematical
structure, and each brain is merely an instance of a substructure in the univer-
sal structure. We therefore proceed straight to the more interesting case of the
identity theory.
3 The identity theory
The identity theory asserts that the mind and the brain both exist, but the
mind can be reduced to the brain in the specific sense that the mind can be
identified with the brain. It is clear that there are very strong correlations be-
tween the mind and the brain, and research in neurophysiology has enabled the
understanding of these correlations to become increasingly sophisticated. The
identity theory suggests from this that we can re-define what mental properties,
states and processes really are in terms of brain properties, states and processes.
If mental properties can be identified with brain properties, if mental states
can be identified with brain states, and if mental processes can be identified with
brain processes, then the existence of minds poses no problems for universal
structural realism. If minds can be reduced to brains in the sense that mental
properties, states and processes can be defined in terms of brain properties,
states and processes, then because universal structural realism is capable of
incorporating the existence of brains, it is automatically capable of incorporating
the existence of minds.
However, does the identity theory provide a plausible account of the mind?
It is difficult to understand how the subjective nature of experience, which
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arguably characterises the mind, can arise from an objective physical system
such as the brain. In fact, Colin McGinn (2004, p158) lists five characteristics
of mental states, which purportedly prevent them from being identified with
brain states. Mental states are:
• Unobservable — in the sense that they are not perceptible by means of
the senses.
• Asymmetrically accessible — in the sense that the owner of a mental state
has a kind of immediate access to it that other people do not.
• Subjective — in the sense that the nature of a mental state is knowable
only from a single ‘point of view’.
• Non-spatial — in the sense that mental states do not take up a well-defined
region of space.
• Subject-dependent — in the sense that mental states only exist for a
subject of awareness.
In a similar vein, those who endorse the notion that the mind cannot be
identified with the brain, have a favourite mantra, in which, following Nagel
(1986), they recite that there is something which it is like to be the subject
of experience. The force of this claim seems to reside in the very fact that it
makes any sense. The very fact that the reader knows what it is like to be a
subject of experience, is the only thing which can make this a meaningful claim.
Whilst this slogan is a good weapon against those who seek to eliminate the
mind, it only entails that the mind cannot be identified with the brain if it can
also be shown that there is nothing which it is like to be a brain. If the mind
exists, if there is something which it is like to be a mind, and if the mind can
be identified with the brain, then it follows that there is something which it is
like to be a brain.
Let us consider the identity theory in terms of inter-theoretical reduction
within science and physics. One type of reduction relationship between a the-
ory T1, and another theory T2, occurs when T2 represents a larger domain of
phenomena than T1, and either the laws and theorems of T1 can be derived as
special cases from those of T2, or the laws and theorems of T1 are at least approx-
imated by a subset of what can be derived from T2 (Butterfield and Isham 1999,
Section 2.2). Thus, for example, special relativity represents a larger domain of
empirical phenomena than Galilean relativity, but there is a limit v/c → 0 in
which special relativity approximates Galilean relativity. However, if we think
of the mind as being theoretically represented in psychology, and the brain as
being theoretically represented in neurophysiology, then these two theories are
not related by this type of reduction relationship. Instead, according to the
identity theory, neurophysiology provides a description of purportedly the same
domain as psychology, but with a higher level of resolution, a greater level of
detail. Moreover, in the case of a highly complex system, such as the brain,
it may not be practically possible to use the higher level of resolution of the
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reducing theory to re-derive the laws of the reduced theory; the problem may
be computationally intractable. Thus, a second type of reduction relationship
occurs when T2 represents the same domain as T1, but with a greater degree of
resolution, and either the laws and theorems of T1 could, in principle, be derived
from T2, or the laws and theorems of T1 are at least approximated by a subset
of what could, in principle, be derived from T2.
In general, a theory which provides a higher level of resolution often does
so by postulating entities or structures of a smaller size than those in a lower-
resolution theory. Hence, reductionistic explanations often explain macroscopic
phenomena in terms of the states and processes of much smaller constituent
particles and fields. The best example is the reduction of thermodynamics
to statistical molecular mechanics.2 As a consequence of increasing the level of
resolution, there is a one-many correspondence between the states of the reduced
theory and the states of the reducing theory. The theory with a lower level of
resolution provides a coarse-grained description, while the theory with a higher
level of resolution provides a fine-grained description. Each state in the coarse-
grained theory corresponds to multiple states in the fine-grained theory, and it
is only the higher level of resolution provided by the fine-grained theory which
enables it to discriminate between those different states. One conventionally
refers to the states of the lower-level, higher-resolution theory as ‘microstates’.
One can partition the states of the lower-level theory into equivalence classes,
consisting of those states which are indistinguishable at the coarse-grained level
of resolution provided by the higher-level theory. It is conventional to refer to
these equivalence classes as ‘macro-states’. The macro-states correspond in a
one-to-one fashion with the states of the higher-level theory.
Arguably, it is a necessary condition for a theoretical reduction relation-
ship that the higher-level properties are definable in terms of the lower-level
properties. For example, temperature in thermodynamics is definable as mean
molecular kinetic energy in statistical molecular mechanics. Following Nagel,
these inter-theoretical definitions are called ‘bridge laws’. In a reductive expla-
nation, the domain of enquiry in re-conceptualized in terms of the ontology of
the lower-level theory, and in particular, the bridge laws are commonly taken
to reveal the true identity of the higher-level properties. Thus, the temperature
of a gas just is the mean kinetic energy of its molecular constituents.
So, is the mind-brain relationship a reduction relationship of the second type
defined above? Certainly, a mental state is a very coarse-grained, inexact level
of description, whilst a brain state is a fine-grained and exact level of descrip-
tion. Hence each mental state corresponds to multiple brain states, and one
can partition brain states into mentally indistinguishable equivalence classes.
Let us call these equivalence classes ‘brain macro-states’. Similarly, there are
brain macro-processes, which evolve one brain macro-state into another, in cor-
respondence with the evolution of one mental state into another. However, the
relationship between psychology and neurophysiology fails to satisfy the cited
2Note, however, that there remains a debate in the philosophy of science over whether this
reduction is partial or complete.
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necessary condition for a reduction relationship, that of defining the higher level
properties in terms of the lower-level properties. The feeling of pain and the
perception of colour, for example, are psychological properties which cannot
be defined in terms of neurophysiological properties. A psychological property
is unobservable, asymmetrically accessible, subjective, non-spatial and subject-
dependent, while a neurophysiological property is “observable by means of the
sense organs; it is accessible to oneself and others in the same way; it is objec-
tive in that it can be grasped from any point of view. . . ; it is spatially defined;
it could, in principle, exist without being experienced by a subject,” (McGinn
2004, p158).
In particular, the suggestion that mental properties be defined in terms
of brain properties, should be rejected because the brain is spatial, but the
mind is not; the two levels of description are non-comparable in this respect.
The brain and the mind do not provide different levels of spatial resolution
of a fixed domain. Although the one-many mapping between mental states
and brain states entails that the brain provides a lower-level, higher-resolution
description, it does not provide a re-definition of the terms contained in the
higher-level mental description.
A more acceptable concept than mind-brain identification is the weaker no-
tion of supervenience, which holds that any change in the higher level properties,
states and processes of a composite system, must correspond to a change in the
lower level properties, states and processes. The idea is that there can be no
difference in the higher-level state of a composite system without a difference
in the lower-level state, otherwise there would be a one-many correspondence
between the lower-level states and higher-level states. In these terms, the mind
clearly supervenes upon the brain: each brain state determines a unique mental
state, and each change in mental state requires a change of brain state. How-
ever, supervenience does not require the higher-level description to be definable
in terms of the lower-level description. In particular, supervenience does not re-
quire the properties of the higher-level description to be definable in terms of the
properties of the lower-level description. When supervenience is combined with
this claim of irreducibility, the resulting credo is often termed ‘emergentism’.
Emergent states and properties are higher level states and properties which su-
pervene upon lower level states and properties, but which are not definable in
terms of those lower-level properties.
Note, however, that there is a distinction between ontological emergentism
and epistemological emergentism. The former claims that ‘genuinely novel’
properties exist at a higher level, whilst the latter merely claims that the human
intellect may lack the imaginative capacity or conceptual resources to define the
higher level properties in terms of the lower level parts, properties and relation-
ships. Rejection of the mind-brain identity theory does not entail acceptance of
ontological emergentism.
One can also introduce a distinction between ontological mind-brain identity
and epistemological mind-brain identity. The latter asserts that our conception
of the mind can be identified with our conception of the brain, and it is this
version of the identity thesis which I have rejected. The ontological version
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of the mind-brain identity thesis accepts that our conception of the mind may
not be identifiable with our conception of the brain, but holds that that which
appears to us as the mind, and that which appears to us as the brain, exist
as the same thing. Epistemological emergentism and the ontic version of the
mind-brain identity thesis are consistent with each other.
4 Functionalism
Functionalism accepts that the mind and the brain exist; it accepts that the
mind cannot be identified with the brain; and it accepts that the mind super-
venes on the brain. Functionalism claims that the mind is a set of functionalities
and capabilities, at a higher level of description than the brain. Thus, although
functionalism accepts that the mind cannot be identified with the brain, it still
contends that the mind can be objectively characterised.
The notion that the identity of the mind is defined by a set of functionalities
and capabilities, leads to the notion of substrate-independence, the claim that
the mind could supervene upon multiple substrates, of which the brain just
happens to be one example. Neurophysiology demonstrates how brain structure
supports the functionalities and capabilities of the mind, hence neurophysiology
demonstrates how the structure of the brain supports these mental structures.
However, functionalism argues that there are multiple substrates which could
support such mental structures, hence one cannot identify the mind with the
brain.
From the perspective of structural realism, functionalism holds that the
mind possesses a structure which cannot be identified with the structure of
the brain. In other words, functionalism holds that the structure of the mind is
non-isomorphic to the structure of the brain.
Functionalism holds that a mental state has functional relationships to per-
ceptual stimuli, behavioural responses, and other mental states. i.e., a mental
state maps current perceptual stimuli to behavioural responses and the next
mental state. Thus, in mathematical terms, one can treat a mental state as a
function
I → S ×O ,
where I is the set of input states (the perceptual states), S is the set of mental
states, and O is the set of output states, (the behavioural responses). By im-
plication, the set of mental states is then a set of such functions, and this set
presumably possesses some structure.
Functionalism, however, should not be conflated with ‘behaviourism’, which
claims that mental states have no ‘internal’ content, and are nothing but maps
between perceptual stimuli and behavioural responses. Functionalism claims
that mental states are a lot more than such maps. We shall now consider two
specific functionalist approaches to the mind: the ‘top-down’ approach provided
by the conjunction of the representational theory of the mind (RTM) and the
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computational theory of the mind (CTM), and the ‘bottom-up’ approach of con-
nectionism. In particular, we shall attempt to highlight the structural aspects
of these approaches.
The RTM attempts to provide a functionalist account of ‘intentional’ mental
states. These are states, such as beliefs and desires, in which the attention of the
mind is directed towards something, called the ‘content’ of the intentional state.
The RTM claims that an intentional mental state is a type of functional state
that involves a relationship between the thinker and the symbolic representation
of something. If a thinker holds the belief that ‘the cat is on the mat’, then
the thinker is held to be in one type of functional relationship to a symbolic
representation of ‘the cat is on the mat’. If a thinker holds the desire that
‘the cat is on the mat’, then the thinker is held to be in a different type of
functional relationship to the same symbolic representation. Beliefs and desires
differ by virtue of the fact that they cause different succeeding mental states and
behavioural responses. The RTM considers mental processes such as thinking,
reasoning and imagining to be sequences of intentional mental states.
At this point it is judicious to introduce the distinction between the conscious
and the unconscious mind. There are, of course, various approaches to defining
consciousness. For example, in the so-called ‘higher-order’ theory, a conscious
mental state is a state which is accompanied by a higher-order mental state, an
intentional state whose content is the first mental state. An unconscious mental
state is then defined to be a mental state which is not accompanied by such a
higher-order state (van Gulick 2004, Section 9.1). Our introspective knowledge
of the mind is limited to knowledge of the conscious mind, and it is something of
a cliche to say that the conscious mind constitutes only the surface of the mind.
Perhaps, however, a more powerful analogy is to suggest that the conscious mind
provides an interface to the unconscious mind, in the way that a web browser
can provide an interface to a remote database. Processes such as the uncon-
scious execution of familiar tasks, and the unconscious retrieval of facts from
memory, suggest that there is something of a client-server relationship between
the conscious and unconscious mind. The RTM may or may not be applicable
to the unconscious as well as the conscious mind, but, at the very least, one
can expect the unconscious mind to possess a structure, in the same sense that
a relational database possesses a relational structure3. The unconscious mind
must possess some sort of structure in order to perform the tasks which it does
perform. We shall return to the unconscious mind later below.
Many advocates of the RTM claim that the mental representations which
provide the content of beliefs, desires, and other intentional states, possess an
internal structure. They hold that this internal system of representation has a
set of symbols, a syntax, and a semantics, collectively termed the language of
thought. There are rules for composing the symbols into expressions, propo-
sitions, and mental images, hence the content of an intentional state can be
said to possess a symbol structure, and one might call this the infrastructure
3In computer science, the data in a relational database is a collection of ‘tables’, each of
which comprises a set of n-tuples. Such n-tuples correspond, with some differences, to the
extension of an n-ary relation.
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of an intentional state. The computational theory of mind (CTM) is then the
conjunction of the RTM with the claim that mental reasoning is the formal,
syntactical manipulation of such symbols (Horst 2005).
In contrast with the CTM, connectionism does not attempt to model the
mind by ascribing a structure to intentional states at the outset. Instead, con-
nectionism adopts a ‘bottom-up’ approach, modelling the mind with ‘neural
networks’, abstractions from the network of nerve cells and synapses in the hu-
man brain. In the connectionist approach, the foremost structures are those
possessed by the neural networks, not those possessed by sets of intentional
states, or those possessed by the symbols which purportedly compose the con-
tents of intentional states.
A neural network consists of a set of nodes, and a set of connections be-
tween the nodes. The nodes in a neural network possess activation levels, the
connections between nodes possess weights, and the nodes have numerical rules
for calculating their next activation level from (i) the previous activation level,
and (ii) the weighted inputs from other nodes. The pattern of connections and
activation levels can be thought to provide a lower-level of description than
that provided by sets of intentional states and symbol structures. However,
under certain circumstances, the pattern of connections and activation levels is
deemed to provide a representation of things, hence the connectionist models of
the mind can still be subsumed under the aegis of the RTM. It should also be
noted that connectionism (arguably) contrasts with the CTM in the sense that
thinking can take place at a sub-symbolic level.
To answer the question posed at the outset, these functionalist accounts
of the mind entail that the mind can be incorporated into structural realism.
These accounts claim that the mind possesses a structure, albeit a higher-level
structure than that of the brain. All functionalist accounts accept that the
mind supervenes on the brain, but they reject the idea that the higher-level
structure can be defined in terms of the lower-level structure. One can accept
that the mind is essentially subjective, but one can still hold that it possesses
a structure, a distinct structure from the structure of the brain. The structure
may well be a non-spatial structure, which cannot be reduced to any of the
structures which characterise the brain, but it is, nevertheless, the structure of
subjective experience. Intentional mental states are not observable by means of
the sense organs, are directly accessible only to their owners, and do not occupy
space, yet they nevertheless possess a structure which functionalism and the
RTM sets out to capture.
However, functionalism and the RTM do not capture all there is to cap-
ture about the mind. Whilst one can represent the second-order structure of
the mind, just as one represents the second-order structure of the extra-mental
world, such structure does not enable one to know what it is like to feel pain
or see colour. Whilst the second-order structure of the mind can be known,
we cannot identify the mind with its second-order structure. Just as struc-
tural realism accepts that there are known first-order empirical properties and
relationships, the application of structural realism to the mind should accept
that there are known first-order mental properties and relationships, such as the
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qualia of mental states. The quale of a mental state is that state’s feel, and one
might claim that “it is the feels that make the mental states the mental states
they are,” (Lycan 1994, p322). The quale of a mental state can be treated as a
first-order property of the state, and, in general, introspection provides us with
knowledge of conscious mental states and their first-order properties.
To conclude, I propose that the distinction between epistemic structural re-
alism (ESR) and ontic structural realism (OSR) is also valid in the case of the
mind. The conventional application of structural realism asserts that there is a
physical world which exists beyond the empirical phenomena, and this physical
world possesses a second-order structure; analogously, the application of struc-
tural realism to the mind should assert that there is an unconscious mind which
exists beyond the introspectively-known conscious mind, and this unconscious
mind possesses a second-order structure. Having made this proposal, ESR would
then assert that the second-order structure of the unconscious mind is all that
can be known of it, and OSR would assert that the second-order structure is all
that exists of the unconscious mind.
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